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Measuring the Degree  of Oligopsony
Power in the Beef Packing Industry
in the Absence  of Marketing
Input Quantity Data
Mary K. Muth and Michael K. Wohlgenant
We develop  a model to measure the degree  of oligopsony power in the beef packing
industry,  while  accommodating variable proportions  technology,  that can be esti-
mated with fewer data requirements. In particular, nonspecialized input quantities,
which are  often not available, are not needed. Through  application of the envelope
theorem,  we show that the relationship between value marginal product and mar-
ginal factor cost can be defined over the prices of the nonspecialized  inputs rather
than their corresponding quantities. When applied to the beef packing industry, we
find no evidence of oligopsony power over our 1967-93  sample period.
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Introduction
Since Appelbaum first demonstrated  an econometric method to measure the degree of
oligopoly power in imperfectly competitive markets, a number of models under alterna-
tive assumptions have been developed and estimated. Schroeter showed how this model
could be extended to measure the degree of oligopoly and oligopsony  power. However,
Schroeter's model assumed fixed proportions technology, an assumption that one may
wish to relax in some applications. In particular, there is evidence that the food process-
ing industries  are  characterized  by  substantial  input substitutability  (Wohlgenant;
Goodwin and Brester); thus the assumption of variable proportions is more appropriate.
In this case, if the price of a specialized input increases,  firms may maintain  output
while reducing their purchases of the input by substituting the nonspecialized inputs
in its place.
More recently, Murray developed a model to measure the degree of oligopsony power
in the pulpwood and sawlogs markets under the assumption of a variable proportions
technology. Application of this method requires data on the quantities of nonspecialized
inputs (e.g., labor and materials); however, in many cases, these data are not available
at an individual product level. In this study, we develop a model to measure the degree
of oligopsony power, while accommodating variable proportions technology, that can be
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applied to markets in which data on nonspecialized input quantities are not available.
Through application of the envelope  theorem, we show that the relationship between
value marginal product and marginal factor cost can be defined over the prices of the
nonspecialized inputs rather than their corresponding quantities.
The model is applied to the beef packing industry-an industry that has generated
much interest of late as measures of market concentration reach high levels.' Recently,
concern has focused on market power on the input side due to the spatial characteristics
of the market. Because  live cattle can be transported a limited distance to slaughter,
cattle producers in a particular location may face few buyers for their cattle. The results
of most previous structural models of the beef  packing industry have concluded that beef
packing firms, at least part of the time, are exercising market power in the purchase of
finished cattle for slaughter (Schroeter; Schroeter and Azzam; Azzam; Azzam and Park;
Koontz,  Garcia,  and  Hudson).  These  results  are  in contrast to  a Grain  Inspection,
Packers and Stockyards Administration (GIPSA) report issued in 1996 that found little
evidence of market power in beef packing. In fact, it found that larger beef  packing firms
paid higher prices for cattle after adjusting for differences in cattle quality [U.S. Depart-
ment of Agriculture  (USDA)/GIPSA 1996b].
This contradiction  in results  may be due, in part, to inappropriate  restrictions on
the structural models.  Specifically, all of the studies listed above assume a fixed pro-
portional relationship between live cattle inputs and processed beef output. However,
Wohlgenant found evidence of substantial substitution possibilities between farm inputs
and marketing inputs for beef and veal. In addition, Goodwin  and Brester concluded
that technological  changes  in the food industry as a whole have  allowed for greater
input substitutability. Other restrictions found in these models include the use of prior
point  estimates  or estimated  series  of the input  supply  elasticities  (Schroeter  and
Azzam;  Azzam  and Park),  yet it is likely  that these  input  supply  elasticities  have
changed  over  time.  Also,  the standard  errors  of the estimated  coefficients  in these
studies have not been adjusted for the use of prior estimates, thus overstating the level
of significance of the market power components.
The model we develop in this analysis allows for variable proportions technology, yet
does not require marketing input quantity data. Quantity data are available for some
of the nonspecialized  production  inputs  for the meat  packing industry  as a  whole.
However,  they  are  not available  for individual  animal species  such  as beef.  When
we apply this model  to the beef packing industry, we  find no evidence of oligopsony
power over the sample period. These results confirm those of the model in Muth and
Wohlgenant (1999) which tests for market power in either the input or output market
but does not measure the degree of market power. This model may be applied in similar
situations  where imperfect  competition in the input market is of concern, but where
data limitations on input quantities  might preclude one  from using a more  general
specification of oligopsony behavior.
For 1994, the Grain Inspection, Packers and Stockyards Administration reported a four-firm  concentration ratio (CR4)
of 80.9 and a Herfindahl index of 2096 (USDA/GIPSA 1996a).
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A Theoretical Model of an Imperfectly
Competitive Input Market
Assume that the inverse input supply equation for a specialized input can be repre-
sented by
(1)  W1 = g(xl, z),
where w1 is the deflated input price, x1 is the input quantity, and z is a vector of supply
shifters.  Given  this representation  of input  supply,  the profit equation  for a repre-
sentative  firm can be written as
(2)  II  = p.f(xl, x)  - wx 1 - w'x,
where p is the  deflated output price  (at the wholesale  level), f(.)  is the  production
function, x is a vector of quantities of other inputs in the production process (e.g., labor
and energy),  and w is a vector of deflated prices of other inputs.
If the market for the specialized input is perfectly competitive,  then the first-order
condition with respect to the level of the input is such that the input price equals its
value marginal product. That is,
~(3)  O9f^  )~af(x 1, x)
(3)  w 1 = p
ax1
A more general form of the first-order  condition that allows for imperfect competition
is
Og (x,  z)  af(x,  x)
(4)  wl  + 0  - x-  = p ax 1 axa
where  0 is a parameter that indexes  the degree  of market  power.  If the market  is
perfectly competitive,  then 0  = 0, and the first-order condition reduces to equation  (3)
above. If the market is monopsonistic, then 0 = 1, and equation (4) represents marginal
factor  cost (the input price  plus  a monopsony  markdown)  equaling value  marginal
product. Intermediate values of 0 are taken to mean some degree of less than complete
market  power,  in which  case the  interpretation  of this first-order  condition is that
the  "perceived"  marginal  factor  cost  equals  the value  marginal product  of finished
cattle.
The interpretation  of 0  in  equation  (4)  from the viewpoint  of an individual  firm
depends on the assumptions made about aggregation. If it is assumed that the aggregate
marginal product term is obtained by averaging over all firms' marginal products, then
0 is interpreted  as the average  input conjectural  elasticity of firms in the industry.
Alternatively,  if it is assumed that the aggregate marginal product term is a share-
weighted average, 0 takes on the interpretation of an input market Herfindahl index.
Each of these interpretations is derived in the appendix.
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An Empirical Model with Fewer
Data Requirements
The joint estimation  of empirical  specifications  of equations  (1)  and (4) allows us to
measure the degree of oligopsony power in a particular market. As specified, however,
data on the quantities of nonspecialized inputs (i.e., inputs other than x1) are necessary
to estimate the degree of oligopsony power because they are components of the marginal
product. While  such data were available  for Murray's  analysis  of the pulpwood  and
sawlogs markets, they may not be available  for other markets that are of interest. In
this section, we derive a model that does not require data for these input quantities. In
addition, since identifying the degree of oligopsony power requires specifying an input
supply equation, we discuss the empirical specification of the input supply equation for
our particular application to the beef packing industry.
First, note that the marginal product term  f(x,  x)/ax,  requires the quantities of
nonspecialized inputs used in the production process. The need for these nonspecialized
input quantities can be circumvented by applying the envelope theorem to a redefined
profit equation. Thus, we rewrite the profit equation for beef packing firms, substituting
the optimal quantities of the noncattle inputs conditional on the level of cattle input, x1,
in place of the previously specified unconditional quantities. Assuming that there are
two nonspecialized inputs in the production process, labor (x2) and energy (X3), equation
(2) can be rewritten as
(5)  n(p, x  z, wZ, w23)  = P f(X1,  x2, x3)  - g(X,  Z)X1  - W2  - W3X3,
where x*  and  x3  are the optimal quantities of x2 and x3 conditional on the level of the
specialized input, x1.2 Specifically,  x2  = x2(x1 , w2, W3,p) and x3  =  x3(x1, w2, w8,p).
Now, the first-order condition with respect to the choice of xl is
(6)  011  a-  f(x 1, x2*, x)  f(.)  ax2 af(.)  ax3
ax1 ax  aX  ax  ax  ax1
g(xl, z)  x  x  ax  x X-  6 -
X
1 - W1 - W2  - W  3  0
ax2  ax  3  ax, Ox9  Ox 1 Ox  1
which can be rearranged as
(7)  1 +  g(x,  z)X 1 =+  f(  p  )  - w2
axl  axl  ax*  ax
+ (  af(.)  x;  3
2 Capital costs are not included because they are generally a small share of food processing costs (Morrison).
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Assuming that the nonspecialized inputs are purchased in perfectly competitive  mar-
kets, equation (7) reduces to
(g(x1, z)  af[ 1, x2(X 1,  2,  w3,p),  x3(X1, w2, w,  p)]
(8)  1
= -0  ---  xX 1 + p
Ox I ax1
That is, the first-order condition for profit maximization can be derived by simply differ-
entiating equation (5) with respect to x1, holding x2 and x3 at their optimally determined
levels (an application of the envelope  theorem). Note that now the marginal product
is defined over the prices of the nonspecialized inputs rather than the corresponding
quantities.
In an output market counterpart to our model, Lau establishes that only the reduced-
form parameters of the marginal  cost function are necessary for identifying oligopoly
power.  Applying the same logic to the input market model, the degree of oligopsony
power can  be  identified  with a  reduced-form  value  marginal  product  specification.
Inserting a linear reduced-form value marginal product, for example, and solving for w,
results in the following expression:
(9)  w I =  -+  ,  +  g+  x 3W 3 +  + a  +  3  + a4p.
ax1
To  complete the model,  the input supply equation must  be  specified.  The  supply
specification  we employ is intended to characterize  the short-run  supply response of
cattle producers whereby the supply of finished cattle is expressed as a function of the
price of cattle (w1), beginning-of-year inventories of finished cattle (I), and the price of
feed corn (C) (Rosen; Brester and Wohlgenant; Marsh). Based on a preliminary plotting
of the data, this short-run  supply relationship  is specified in terms of the slaughter-
inventory ratio as a linear function of the beef-corn price ratio as follows:
x1 1  W
(10)  I  +6  1  +  , (10)  I  0  °  -1 C-  + 62 1 T + 63T,
C  C
where T is a linear time trend to account for technical change and other unaccounted
for factors affecting short-run supply response of beef. As indicated below, one advan-
tage of this specification  is that  it  allows  for identification  of the  degree  of market
power.3
To complete the specification,  Og(.)/Oxl  is derived from the empirical specification of
the input supply equation above. Solving equation (10) for w1 and differentiating with
respect to x1 yields the following expression for the marginal effect of the input level on
cattle prices:
3 One potential  problem with a short-run supply model for  cattle is that it can produce  a negative supply response. As
discussed by Rosen, the reason is that, in the short run, higher cattle prices can induce farmers  to delay the slaughter age
of cattle to increase the weight at which they are sold. In addition, if cattle prices are rising and farmers expect higher prices
to prevail in the future, then they will retain heifers to add to the breeding stock rather than marketing them immediately.
The reason a negative supply response is problematic when estimating the degree of market power is that it switches the sign
of the markdown term to that of a markup term instead. For our particular data set, this situation does not seem to be of
concern because graphical analysis strongly suggests a positive supply response in the short run.
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(11)  ag(.)  =  C f  1
Ox 1 I  61  + 62T
Note that equation (10)  allows for identification  of 0  because the slope of the supply
function, given by equation (11), is a function of C/II and T.4 Substituting this expression
into equation (9) yields the final empirical specification of the first-order condition, or
the demand relation:
(12)  W1  +  62T )  I X 1 + a
l x l + a 2 2 + 
a 3 w 3 + a4P'
Equations  (10)  and (12) make up the system of equations that will allow for deter-
mination of whether beef packing firms have  been exercising market power in their
purchases of finished cattle. Estimates of the model are obtained assuming both that 0
remained constant over the sample period and, because the structure of the industry has
changed over time, that 0 varied as a function of trend  (i.e.,  0  =  00 + 01T).5
We also investigate whether the results regarding oligopsony power are sensitive to
the choice of functional form for the reduced-form expression of the marginal product
function in equation (8). Two alternative functional forms are considered:  a log-linear
form and a functional form in which the variables  are replaced  by their square roots.
In a general  sense, these functional  forms may be viewed as first-order  approxima-
tions of the unknown functional form. In the first case, the derivative may be viewed as
the first-order partial derivative of a translog function, and in the second case, the first-
order partial derivative of the generalized Leontief.6
Assuming the log derivative of f(.) with respect to x1 in equation (8) is linear in the
logarithms, the marginal product of xl can be written as
(13)  (o  =  (.)  - (a  + y1 ln(xl)  + y 121n(w2)  + y 131n(wa  )  + y1pln(p)).
Ox 1 x1
Substituting this expression into the first-order condition, equation (8), and multiplying
through by xll(pq) results in the following demand relation:
4 Bresnahan demonstrated graphically the requirement for identifying oligopoly power: the slope of the demand curve for
the product must be changing over time. The input market analog to Bresnahan's analysis is demonstrated in Muth and
Wohlgenant (1997),  and is similar conceptually  to Just and Chern  except that Just and Chern assumed monopoly in the
output market for the product in question (processing tomatoes) and analyzed the effect of a one-time change in input supply.
In either case, changes in the slope of the input supply equation allow for the identification of market power. The implication
for the model presented here is that the input supply equation must be modeled in such a way that its slope, ag(xl, z)/9xl,
varies over time.
Another possibility is to specify 0 as a function of the Herfindahl index, but the series is only available beginning in 1980.
The CR4, which could be used as a proxy, is highly correlated with time and hence yields results similar to a time trend.
6As a referee pointed out, it is important to recognize that af(-)/ax,  in equation (8), when expressed in terms of x,  w2, w3,
and p, is a  reduced-form expression  for the marginal product of x,.  Therefore,  it cannot be derived  directly by partially
differentiating a function in which x,,  W 2, W 3, andp appear as arguments. However, it is valid to consider this reduced-form
marginal product function as a function in its own right, and therefore  to utilize a flexible functional form as  an approxi-
mating function to the true, unknown functional form. The functional forms chosen for this application cover a wide range
of flexible forms and satisfy the requirement for identification set forth by Lau.
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W x,  Og(x,  Z) x2
(14)  si  - -_  - g(  -)  + ai + y1 ln(xl)
pq  OXl  pq
+ y 121n(w 2)  + y131n(w 3)  + ylpln(p),
where s, is the cost share of input x1 in the production of beef, and q  =  f(.). This second
form of the demand relation is then estimated jointly with the input supply equation.
In the third functional form considered, the reduced-form marginal product in equa-
tion (8) is approximated  by:
(15)  f  NPio  + P 11 iX  + P 12W2  + P13 W3 2 +Plp
OX 1
By substituting this expression  for marginal  product into  the first-order  condition,
equation (8), and dividing through byp, the following third specification of the demand
relation is obtained:
W1  g(xl, z)  x1 1/2 (16)  r 1 - = -0  - +  o + p
p  aOx  p
W  1/2  ,  1/2  1/2
+ P 1 2 P2  +  3W  +  1 2
where r1 is the ratio of the price of cattle to the wholesale price of beef. Again, this equa-
tion was estimated jointly with the input supply equation. In each of these alternative
specifications,  the market power parameter (0) was estimated both as a constant and
a linear time trend.
Data Description
The data used to estimate the preceding model are aggregate  annual time-series data
for the years  1967 through  1993. Farm beef quantities  and inventories of beef cattle
were obtained from the USDA's Red Meats Yearbook and Livestock and Meat Statistics.
The farm price for cattle is the series "slaughter steer prices, Choice grade 2-4, Omaha,
1,000-1,100  pounds"  in both of the above  publications.  These  prices were  adjusted
for by-product allowances, which were obtained, along with wholesale beef prices, from
the USDA's Animal Products Branch of the Economic  Research  Service.  Corn prices
were taken from the USDA's Feed Situation  and Outlook Report, the energy price index
from the USDA's Food Cost Review, and the average hourly meat packing wage from
the U.S.  Department  of Labor's Employment, Hours, and Earnings, United States,
1909-1994. Per capita personal consumption expenditures and population data (which
were used as instrumental variables  for the endogenously determined wholesale beef
price) and the consumer price index were obtained from the Economic Report of the
President (Congress  of the U.S.).  The  additional  instrumental  variables,  the retail
poultry CPI and the retail pork CPI, were taken from the USDA's Food Consumption,
Prices, and Expenditures.  All price and income data were deflated using the consumer
price index.
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Table  1.  Summary of Values and 95% Confidence Intervals for the Market
Power Coefficient
Model Specification  Value  95% Confidence Interval
1. Reduced-Form Value Marginal Product
Specification:
(a)  Constant 0  0.00001  [-0.00005,  0.00007]
(b)  0 = 00 + 01T
T= 1  0.00115  [-0.00460,  0.00690]
T= 27  -0.00067  [-0.01145,  0.01011]
2.  Translog Conditional Production Function
Specification:
(a)  Constant 0  0.00008  [-0.00139,  0.00155]
(b)  0 = 00 + 01T
T= 1  0.00135  [-0.00375,  0.00645]
T=27  -0.00016  [-0.00108,  0.00076]
3.  Generalized  Leontief Conditional Production
Function Specification:
(a)  Constant 0  -0.00015  [-0.00090,  0.00059]
(b)  0  = 00 + 01T
T= 1  -0.00036  [-0.00073,  0.00001]
T= 27  0.00006  [-0.00008,  0.00020]
Estimation Results and Specification Testing
The input supply equation and the perceived demand equation were estimated jointly
with additive error terms using nonlinear three-stage least squares. Three alternative
specifications  of the market power  component  were considered:  one in which  0 was
estimated as a constant parameter,  one in which 0 was specified as a linear function of
time, and one in which 0 was restricted to zero. In this last case, the perceived demand
equation represents the competitive condition that the input price is equal to its value
marginal product. The price of finished cattle (w1), the quantity of finished cattle (x1),
the price of processed beef (p), and the ratio x1/I are endogenous. The instrument set
included the exogenous variables in the model in addition to variables that influence
the final demand for beef, and thus the price of processed beef-namely,  population,
consumer expenditures, the retail price of pork, and the retail price of poultry.
Initially, equations (10) and (12) were overfitted with first-order autoregressive terms.
In both equations in each specification,  the estimated autoregressive  parameter was
close to one, thus indicating the presence of a unit root error process. Therefore, both
equations  were reestimated  in first differences,  and the resulting error process  was
stationary. Visual inspection of the autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation plots of
the residuals revealed  no remaining evidence of autocorrelation.  All of the estimated
autocorrelations  and partial autocorrelations  were within two standard errors of zero
for 12 lags. Ljung and Box statistics calculated at six and 12 lags failed to reject the null
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Table 2.  Results of Nonlinear 3SLS Estimation of Cattle Input Supply and
Perceived Demand Equations: Reduced-Form VMP Specification  (1967-93)
Market Power Models
Competition
Variable  / (Coefficient)  Constant  0  0 = 00 + 01T  Model
Input Supply Equation (dependent variable =  x1 /I):
w  ()  0.00307  0.00048  0.00303
C  (0.00227)  (0.00122)  (0.00234)
w T  (6)  -0.00016  -0.00001  -0.00016 -1  T  (62)
C  (0.00012)  (0.00003)  (0.00012)
T  (63)  0.00602  0.00279  0.00608
(0.00396)  (0.00303)  (0.00408)
Perceived Demand Equation (dependent variable  =  wl):
Constant  (00)  0.00001  0.00122
(0.00003)  (0.00312)
T  (01)  -- 0.00007
(0.00017)
x1 (oa)  -0.00010  -0.00013  -0.00010
(0.00016)  (0.00016)  (0.00015)
w2 (o2)  -0.23722  0.13139  -0.25077
(0.61050)  (0.62566)  (0.57394)
W 3 (a3)  -0.00601  -0.00573  -0.00616
(0.00402)  (0.00410)  (0.00375)
p  (a4)  0.54608  0.54842  0.54642
(0.02460)  (0.02434)  (0.02323)
Objective Value  1.5836  1.5283  1.6150
Notes:  Numbers in parentheses  are standard errors.  Both equations are estimated in first differences.
Endogenous variables are wl, xl, p, and x1/I.
hypothesis (at the 5% level) that the residual series are white noise. Consequently, no
further corrections  for autocorrelation  were made.
Regardless of the model specification,  estimates of the market power component (0)
were close to zero  and insignificant.  The results are summarized  in table  1.  For the
specifications in which 0 varied over time, its values were calculated at the first and last
observations of the sample. Overall, estimates of 0 range from -0.00067  to 0.00135. 7 For
each estimate, 95% confidence intervals (which appear in table 1 as well) contained the
value zero. Furthermore, for the linear value marginal product specification, each of the
models containing the market power component was tested against the perfect compe-
tition model using Gallant and Jorgenson's method of testing nonlinear restrictions.  In
each case, the restriction that 0 is zero could not be rejected at the 5% level. Hence, it
appears from these  data that beef packers  were not exercising  market power in the
purchase of finished cattle  over the 1967-93  time period. These results are opposite
7 Although the negative values of 0 are not theoretically  possible, they arise in this situation from sample variation.
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Table 3.  Results of Nonlinear 3SLS Estimation of Cattle Input Supply and




Variable / (Coefficient)  Constant  0  0 = 00 + 01T  Model
Input Supply Equation (dependent variable =  x1/I):
W  (  0.00007  0.00084  0.00298
- (  1) C  (0.00061)  (0.00149)  (0.00233)
wT  (6)  0.00000  -0.00002  -0.00016
C  (0.00001)  (0.00004)  (0.00012)
T  (6  )  0.00261  0.00352  0.00612
(0.00306)  (0.00305)  (0.00406)
Perceived Demand Equation (dependent variable = SHARE):
Constant  (00)  0.00008  0.00140
(0.00075)  (0.00271)
T  (01)  - -0.00006
(0.00011)
ln(x1)  (Y 11)  0.15319  0.15010  0.13862
(0.08632)  (0.07915)  (0.07990)
ln(w2)  (y 12)  -0.13211  -0.07766  -0.12167
(0.07684)  (0.08211)  (0.07396)
lIn(w  )  (y13)  -0.01368  -0.00350  -0.02659
(0.02768)  (0.02679)  (0.02605)
ln(p)  (Y  p)  0.10038  0.10790  0.10257
(0.04141)  (0.03925)  (0.04064)
Objective Value  1.6739  1.6252  1.6752
Notes:  Numbers in parentheses  are standard  errors. Both equations are estimated in first differences.
Endogenous variables are  w 1, x1, p, x1/I, and SHARE =  wlx/lpq.
those noted earlier in which fixed proportions was assumed, and have implications for
the market conduct investigation activities of the USDA's Grain Inspection, Packers and
Stockyards Administration.
The complete  results  for the reduced-form  value  marginal product  (VMP) speci-
fication  are presented in table 2. For the most part, the results  of estimation appear
reasonable. The relationship between the ratio of prices  (w  /C) and the marketing ratio
(x 1/I ) is positive. The slopes, given by the inverse of equation (11), and standard errors
of the input  supply  equation  were  calculated  conditional  on the  sample  means  for
each  model  specification.  The  corresponding  elasticities,  which  ranged  from 0.017
to 0.042 depending on the model  specification,  indicate nearly fixed cattle supply, as
does the estimate of 0.14 obtained by Ospina and Shumway over an earlier time period
(1956-79).
The remaining results of the perceived demand equation are dominated by the effect
of output prices (p)  on input prices (iw). As expected, an increase ine  output prices for
processed beef has a strongly positive effect on the price of finished cattle. For the most
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Table 4.  Results of Nonlinear 3SLS Estimation of Cattle Input Supply and
Perceived Demand Equations: Square-Root Marginal Product Specification
(1967-93)
Market  Power Models
Competition
Variable / (Coefficient)  Constant  0  0  = 00 + 01T  Model
Input Supply Equation (dependent variable =  x1 I ):
w_1  ()  0.00075  0.00238  0.00310
C  (0.00156)  (0.00219)  (0.00234)
1 T  (d)  -0.00002  -0.00010  -0.00016
C  2  (0.00005)  (0.00010)  (0.00012)
T  (63)  0.00260  0.00480  0.00613
(0.00308)  (0.00358)  (0.00408)
Perceived Demand Equation (dependent variable  = w1/p):
Constant  (00)  -0.00015  -0.00037
(0.00038)  (0.00038)
T  (1)  - 0.00002  -
(0.00002)
1/2  -0.00022  -0.00044  -0.00010
x~~~~~ 1 (Ih(0.00046)  (0.00040)  (0.00044)
1/2  -0.01234  -0.00324  -0.02319
W~ 2 P(  P12)  (0.02885)  (0.02759)  (0.02607)
1/2  -0.00211  -0.00462  -0.00233
w 3 P13)  (0.00131)  (0.00145)  (0.00126)
1/2  (p  )  0.00513  0.00152  0.00421
P~~ (~p ~(0.00399)  (0.00367)  (0.00389)
Objective Value  1.6526  1.5618  1.6789
Notes:  Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. Both  equations are estimated in first differences.
Endogenous variables are  w 1, x1, p, x1/I, and wl/p.
part, the  deflated  noncattle  input prices,  labor (w2) and  energy  (w3),  have negative
effects on the input price for cattle.  This result occurs because noncattle input prices
cause two opposing effects  on input demand for cattle.  An increase in the price  of an
input causes a substitution away from the input and toward an increase in demand for
cattle. However,  the increase  in the price of-the  input may also cause a decrease in
production, and thus a decrease in demand for cattle. The negative coefficient estimates
for the price of labor and the price of energy indicate that the latter effect dominates.
Finally, the relationship between the finished cattle quantity  (x1) and finished cattle
prices (w1) is not significantly different from zero. This result most likely occurs because
the technology approximates constant returns to scale; hence the effect of output prices
on input prices dominates.
The  results  of the  two  alternative  specifications  of the  value  marginal  product
terms are  similar to the reduced-form  specification.  The results  of the specification
derived from the translog conditional production function are presented in table 3. As
noted previously, the estimates of 0 are near zero and insignificant.  The input supply
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elasticities  are small, ranging from 0.004 to 0.039, again indicating nearly fixed cattle
supply. Most of the coefficients on the value marginal product term have expected signs.
However, with this specification, the effect of output prices on the input share is positive
but less dominant than the effect of output prices on input prices in the previous speci-
fication. Noncattle input prices again have negative  effects.  Finally, the effect  of the
input quantity on the input share is positive, indicating that the input demand relation
(holding output price constant) is elastic.
The results of the final specification using the generalized Leontief conditional pro-
duction function are presented in table 4. As before, the estimates of 0 are near zero and
insignificant. Input supply elasticities ranged from 0.02 to 0.05, and all other results are
similar to the reduced-form value marginal product specification.
Conclusions
Most models that allow for the estimation  of the degree  of oligopsony power assume
fixed  proportions technology.  For some applications,  the assumption of variable pro-
portions technology is more appropriate.  However,  relaxing the assumption  of fixed
proportions increases the data requirements of the model. In particular,  data on the
quantities of nonspecialized input quantities that are needed are frequently not avail-
able.
We  develop  a general model  that allows  one  to estimate  the degree of oligopsony
power without these  data, yet still  allows for variable proportions technology.  When
applied to the beef packing industry, we find no evidence of oligopsony power over the
1967-93  sample  period.  This  general  framework  has  applications  beyond  those
presented here.  For example,  it  may be  appropriate  if one  is interested in regional
measures of oligopsony  power and data are available for regional prices, but the only
regional quantities that are available are those of the output and the specialized input.
[Received June 1998;  final version received  July 1999.]
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Appendix:
Interpretation of the Market Power Parameter
In this appendix, we demonstrate the derivation of each of the two alternative interpretations of the
market power parameter,  0. Consider the following profit function of a representative  firm i:
(Al)  IIi = pfi(xi, xi) - w1xli  - wX i,
where w 1 =g(x1, z)  as before, and each firm has a unique production function. The general form of the
first-order condition with respect to the choice of the input level (x 1) for firm i is
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II i ,  fi(xli,  xi)  ag(xl, z)  ax1 (A2)  - =  - W-x ui  O.
axli  axii  axl  axi
Rearranging this expression so that the marginal factor cost terms are on the left-hand  side and the
value marginal product is on the right-hand side results in the following:
ax(A3)  i ag(xl, z)  afi(xli, xi)
(A3)  W1  +  - - x1 
= p
ax^  x 1 ax,  Qiax u
Averaging this expression over all firms in the industry results in
(A4)  w  + 1  n  ax1 x1i ag(xl,  z)  = P  af 1(xi, x) (A4)  W1 +  I.z)  =pX
n  =1  9x^i  xi  axi  in  i=1  ax
where n is the number of firms in the industry.
If the aggregate marginal product term in equation (4) of the text is interpreted as the average of the
marginal product terms over firms in the industry, that is,
af(x,  x)  _1  i  af(xi, x)
ax1 n  i=:1  axi
then equation  (A4) takes on the same  form as text equation (4),  except now 0  is interpreted  as the
average of the input conjectural elasticities:
n  1  a ax1 x 1
n  i=1  axi x1
The input conjectural elasticity measures the percentage increase in total industry input purchases in
response to a 1% increase in a particular firm's input purchases. If the industry is perfectly competitive
in its input purchases, then the conjectural  elasticity is zero. If it is monopsonistic,  the conjectural
elasticity is one. In an oligopsonistic industry, the conjectural elasticity will fall between zero and one.
The second interpretation of 0 is obtained by assuming a Cournot input market, in which each firm
in the industry expects no reaction by other firms in the industry to changes in the level of its input
purchases. That is, they expect  ax1/Oaxi = 1. Then equation (A3) can be written instead as follows:
ag(x l ,  z)  afi(xi,  i)
(A5)  w1  + si  1 x1  =  i-----x  ,
ax1 ax i
where si is the input market share of firm i (i.e.,  si =  xi /x1). Multiplying through by si and summing
over the firms in the industry yields the share-weighted industry expression:
(A6)  w1  + ES  )  1  x~  =Sax  pE safi(Xi
i=l  ax,  i=l  dXu
Now, if  the aggregate marginal product term in text equation (4) is interpreted as the share-weighted
marginal products of firms in the industry, that is,
af(xl, x)  af(xli, Xi)
axI i=l axi
then 0 takes on the interpretation of the input market counterpart to the Herfindahl index:
n
i=l
Thus, 0 can be related back to a measure of concentration in the industry.
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